**NICOSIA –** As the calendar prepares to turn to 2026, Cyprus is poised to undertake a significant diplomatic role: the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. President Nikos Christodoulides has declared the island nation "fully prepared" for this six-month tenure, a period that will see Nicosia chairing ministerial meetings and steering key policy initiatives, particularly within the defence domain. While preparations at the Cyprus conference centre are complete, and nineteen specific proposals have been articulated, the assumption of this weighty responsibility is not without its geopolitical complexities, primarily concerning the island's long-standing dispute with Turkey.
The rotating presidency is a fundamental mechanism of the EU's institutional framework, offering member states a platform to advance their priorities and shape the bloc's agenda. For Cyprus, this upcoming presidency represents a crucial opportunity to bolster its standing within the European Union, a sentiment echoed by President Christodoulides, who stated, "a successful Presidency would strengthen Cyprus’ position within the EU." The government has been diligent in its preparations, not only upgrading its conference facilities but also engaging in intensive diplomatic outreach to all 26 member states, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. A recent visit to Kyiv underscored Cyprus' commitment to continued support for Ukraine and its readiness to engage with regional developments.
However, the shadow of the Cyprus issue looms large over the nation's EU aspirations. As a candidate country for EU membership, Turkey's relationship with the bloc is intrinsically linked to the island's status. Cyprus, alongside Greece, has consistently leveraged its position to impede deeper defence cooperation between the EU and Turkey, notably blocking Turkey's participation in the European Defence Agency. This stance has elicited concern from officials within both NATO and the EU, who fear that such friction could undermine crucial defence initiatives.
Specifically, diplomats are apprehensive that this alignment could jeopardise progress on the EU's ambitious €150 billion SAFE defence procurement program and hinder vital coordination efforts between the EU and NATO. The reciprocal nature of international relations is evident here; Turkey, in response to being excluded from certain defence initiatives, has restricted NATO's ability to share classified information with the European Defence Agency. This intricate web of actions and reactions has led Turkish officials to anticipate a slowdown in accession-related progress for Turkey within both the EU and NATO during Cyprus' presidency.
Cyprus, however, appears to be charting a course that seeks to leverage its presidency for broader European strategic goals, including fostering greater European autonomy and an "EU open to the world." President Christodoulides has articulated a strategy that involves engaging with Turkey as a candidate country, while simultaneously expecting a recognition of the EU Presidency's institutional role. The hope is to foster a gradual thawing of relations, potentially through encouraging Turkey's participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace, as a precursor to a phased easing of objections to closer EU-Turkey cooperation. Yet, the requirement for unanimous approval from EU member states for Turkey's involvement in programmes like SAFE remains a formidable hurdle, with Athens and Nicosia unlikely to yield easily. As Nicosia prepares to navigate these diplomatic currents, the effectiveness of its presidency will undoubtedly be measured not only by its legislative achievements but also by its ability to manage the complex geopolitical realities that define its relationship with its neighbours and the wider European security architecture.