**NICOSIA** – In a significant recalibration of its long-standing approach to the Cyprus issue, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership are actively championing a novel strategy: fostering cooperation between the island's two distinct entities without pursuing a comprehensive political settlement. This "cooperation without solution" paradigm, spearheaded by Ankara, aims to sidestep traditional reunification dialogues and instead focus on practical, albeit limited, inter-entity engagement.
This strategic pivot, articulated by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and echoed by other Turkish Cypriot officials, seeks to establish a framework where the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is recognised as an equal partner in international agreements pertaining to the island. Turkish Cypriot representatives are asserting their status as "co-founders with sovereign rights," demanding a voice in any deliberations concerning the island's future, particularly regarding the exploitation of burgeoning natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean. Proposals are circulating for joint management and revenue-sharing of these resources, even in the absence of a definitive peace accord.
Central to this new approach are concepts like a "Cooperation Mechanism" or a "Cooperation Council." These envisioned bodies would facilitate collaboration through existing technical committees, focusing on areas such as hydrocarbon exploration and coordination on matters of mutual interest, effectively creating a loose confederation between two separate states. Turkey is also actively advocating for an Eastern Mediterranean energy conference that would include the TRNC alongside the Republic of Cyprus, a move designed to bolster the international standing of the breakaway entity.
Foreign Minister Fidan has explicitly called for "freezing" political disagreements to prioritise economic collaboration in vital sectors like energy, tourism, and industry. He posits that "Everyone knows this, we know it, they know it, the Europeans know it. So what is the alternative? A two-state solution? That could happen. And after that, the two states could develop a new kind of cooperation or political unity. That choice belongs to them." This sentiment underscores Ankara's enduring advocacy for a two-state resolution, arguing that previous settlement blueprints, which involved power and wealth sharing, were rebuffed by the Greek Cypriot administration.
The implications of this shift are substantial. It potentially signals a move away from the long-pursued goal of a bizonal, bicommunal federation and towards a model that formalises the existing division. This strategy also appears to be a deliberate tactic to delay the progress of the UN-led peace process, including the timeline for an informal five-party meeting, which has been tentatively scheduled for early 2026. By championing parallel moves and a "third way," Ankara and its Turkish Cypriot allies aim to assert the will and rights of Turkish Cypriots in international dealings, while simultaneously facilitating Turkey's broader geopolitical ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean energy landscape. The ultimate objective, as articulated by Fidan, is to "Stop isolating the Turkish Cypriots. We can start meaningful cooperation. While we ‘freeze’ the political issue, we can all enjoy economic development, regional growth, energy resources, tourism, industry and more." This presents a formidable challenge to the Republic of Cyprus and its international partners, potentially reshaping the trajectory of the island's enduring division.